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The Valuation Effects of 
Private Placements of Public 
Corporations’ Common Stock
Wm R McDaniel II and W illiam  R, McDaniel III
Outside shareholders should benefit when the firm issues common stock through 
a private placement. Our propositions are (1) that the private issue of common 
equity creates a value-maximizing insider that has the incentive and ability to 
monitor and discipline, and thereby reduce agency costs and (2) investors can 
reduce uncertainty about the value of thinly traded stock by observing the share 
price negotiated by the v»^ell-informed buyer. Both of these benefits are especially 
applicable to small firms. Our empirical evidence supports hypotheses based on 
these propositions.
The implementation of SEC Rule 144A in April 1990 has drawn attention 
to the private placement market. The rule allows a large institutional 
investor, holding a security with a value exceeding $100 million, to trade 
with other similar institutions without registering with the SEC or holding 
the securities more than two years. The new rule should foster improved 
liquidity for securities that were privately placed with large investors. The 
popular financial press has given some anecdotal evidence that the improved 
liquidity is increasing the number of private placements of debt and preferred 
stock (both convertible and non-convertible).
The long standing market for small firms issuing common shares to 
private investors has received less attention in the press; whether Rule 144A 
has changed the breadth of this market is a question that can only be answered 
after some time has passed. Milligan [7] predicts that 144A equity markets 
will be small until participants have access to a fully developed computer 
based trading network such as ones under consideration by the NYSE and 
AMEX. Regardless of the recent dynamics, small firms have found private 
common stock financing to be beneficial. After a brief discussion of the nature 
of those benefits, this paper focuses on the valuation effects on the outside 
public investors in those firms that privately place common stock.
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BACKGROUND OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
A private placement is a debt or equity transaction requiring no registration 
with the SEC. To qualify as a registration exempt offering, the private 
placement must meet several criteria:
1. there are a limited number of purchasers,
2. the purchasers have access to all important information concerning 
the issuer and the issue,
3. the offering is made through direct communication and negotiation 
with the offerer; there is no general advertising,
4. the securities issued are not redistributed by the purchasers, except after 
specific holding periods have passed or the purchasers have registered 
the securities. Rule 144A modifies this regulation for large 
institutional traders.
These four rules summarize the general requirements for private placements. 
Since 1982, Regulation D (and later amendments) has given more detailed 
information governing private placements.
The principal purchasers of privately placed fixed income securities and 
packages of fixed income securities tied to option-type securities are 
insurance companies and pension funds. The purchasers of privately placed 
common equity securities are more likely to be venture capitalists, wealthy 
individuals and partnerships of wealthy investors. The investors in privately 
placed securities are motivated by the higher total expected rate of return 
relative to investments in traded securities. A security may be privately placed 
at a deep discount to market value, and the issuer may give a substantial 
portion of equity. For example, Taylor [13] states placing shares to start up 
or expand a small firm requires relinquishing 40 to 70% of equity.
Issuers find private placement to have several advantages. Private 
placement has the benefits of being faster than registration and public offer 
and of avoiding the investment banking fees of public offer.’ Financing 
through private investors allows for flexibility in that terms might be 
renegotiated more easily when dealing with a few investors. Private 
companies that use private placement maintain confidentiality concerning 
their operations and financial affairs. Small firms may gain access to 
financing that is pragmatically unavailable through other financial markets. 
Lewis [4], citing an investment banker, says that public debt offerings less 
than $50 million and public equity offerings less than $5 million are 
impractical and not cost efficient. Although the data cire becoming dated, 
Smith [11] found that public equity issues less than $5 million have 
underwriting fees ranging from about 10 to 16%.
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Some equity issuers may use private placement to attempt to avoid the 
typical adverse market reaction (Smith [10] synthesizes this to be 3.14%) to 
seasoned common stock offerings. Whether this is an advantage to private 
placement is moot. Theorists believe that the adverse reaction is caused by 
the offering revealing unfavorable asymmetric information about the issuer. 
If the information were not revealed by the offering, it would become known 
to investors sooner or later. Thus, the value loss will occur regardless of 
whether the equity is issued. On the other hand, practitioners believe that 
the adverse reaction is caused by increasing the supply of shares in the face 
of limited demand.^ Thus, the share price decrease associated with seasoned 
offerings can be avoided by private placement. Both sides of the controversy 
cite empirical observations to support their points of view.
There are also disadvantages to firms using private placements as 
financing sources. The high return to investors, mentioned above, translates 
to a high cost of capital to the issuer and the pre-financing common 
shareholders. The issuer is still likely to have to pay substantial investment 
banking costs as well as legal fees; nevertheless, these expenditures are 
generally less than for an equivalent public offering. Especially in the case 
of a private placement of common shares, management may find reduced 
flexibility in operations because of having “someone watching ... over its 
shoulder” (Gibson [2]).
THE VALUE-MAXIMIZING INSIDER HYPOTHESES
Our hypotheses and empirical work concentrate on the narrow case of the 
effect on outside shareholder wealth of private common stock placement by 
a public company. We define an outside shareholder to be a shareholder who 
can influence corporate policy firm only by voting shares. Each outside 
shareholder holds too few shares to discipline management, and 
mechanisms, such as creating a voting trust with other outside shareholders, 
to collectively influence corporate policy are prohibitively costly. Outside 
shareholders, along with debtholders, suffer the consequences of agency costs. 
Inside shareholders are segmented into two categories. First are managerial 
inside shareholders who ultimately determine corporate policy and who 
benefit from agency costs. Second are value-maximizing inside shareholders 
who receive no benefit from agency costs. Because they hold large blocks of 
common shares, value-maximizing insiders can influence corporate policy 
and reduce managerial consumption of perquisites. Since their shares will 
be eventually sold on the market or put^ to the issuer at market value, the 
private investor’s motivation in exercising its influence is to maximize share 
value.
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As cited above, equity issues of less than |5  million are better placed 
privately than issued publicly. Equity issuances this small are likely to be 
by small corporations. Secondly, thinly traded stocks are more likely to be 
the equity of small firms. Thus, from a practitioner’s point of view^ , a public 
issue of seasoned common stock would require a significant discount from 
currently quoted bid prices. A private issue of the seasoned equity could 
reduce the discount.
Our proposition is that outside shareholders, and thus investors from 
the market in general, should view the purchase of shares by a value- 
maximizing insider favorably. A weak form of the proposition is that the 
benefits to outside shareholders reduce the unfavorable effects caused by the 
signalling of asymmetric information. A stronger proposition is that the 
benefits to outside shareholders are large enough to elicit a positive effect 
on stock price.
The proposed benefits are from several sources. First, the advent of a 
value-maximizing inside shareholder forces management to reduce agency 
costs. The saving may be significant, because small firms, the likely issuers 
of privately place common equity, have high agency costs. Many small 
corporations were family-founded, so that there continues to be agency costs 
related to nepotism. The small firm may be less subject to market discipline 
because it has only simple bank debt supported by collateral. Because fewer 
analysts “follow” the small company, management may not feel the market 
is keeping their activities under close scrutiny.
The ability of the value-maximizing insider to monitor and discipline 
is considerable. In negotiation of the transaction, this investor will demand 
a full audit of the operations and full disclosure of other pertinent facts about 
the issuer. The negotiated agreement will require periodic disclosures to the 
investor beyond the normal financial statements. In many cases, the investor 
will permanently have a representative on the board of directors. If 
management is acting inconsistently with shareholder wealth maximization, 
the value-maximizing insider has the knowledge, the incentive and the 
wherewithal to form a coalition with the outside shareholders to obtain 
voting control of the firm. Although the purpose of buyers of private 
placements is not a takeover, the threat of managerial turnover via voting 
fiat should be enough to influence managers to heed the value-maximizing 
insider. Thus, outside shareholders should react favorably to the advent of 
a value-maximizing insider, because potential agency costs are high and the 
insider has the power and incentive to reduce them.
The second benefit to outside shareholders is that they will have less 
uncertainty about the stock’s value. The bid-ask prices for thinly traded shares 
are set by a market maker. The market maker has much less information, 
of the kind that can be gleaned from market activity, than its specialist
208 JOURNAL OF SMALL BUSINESS FINANCE 1(3) 1992
counterpart on an exchange. The market maker may also manage several 
securities and will expend less effort in researching the price of a slow mover. 
Thus investors do not fully trust the price set by the market maker. The value- 
maximizing insider, at the time of the transaction, has incentive to see that 
the price paid for shares is not too high and requires that the corporation 
reveal more information than the market maker or the outside shareholders 
can obtain.'* Investors are not likely to have the kind of information available 
in investment newsletters and stock tip columns, when the stock is thinly 
traded. The value-maximizing insider will find the expense of research from 
non-company sources to be cost effective. Thus, the market will improve its 
estimate of the value of the shares by observing the price (and allowing for 
the discount) paid by the well-informed value-maximizing insider. The 
market should react favorably to the decreased uncertainty about the stock 
price.
The proposition is similar in force to the “certification” story associated 
with initial public offerings. A number of authors, including Ritter [9], think 
that some potential IPO investors have less information than others. The 
less informed investors coping with their ignorance causes the issuers to suffer 
from investment banker underpricing and thus higher issuance cost. 
Megginson and Weiss [5] suggest that if the IPO issuer is partially owned 
by a venture capitalist (whose position corresponds closely to the value- 
maximizing insider), the IPO results in less underpricing and lower total 
costs of going public, because the existence of the venture capitalist owners 
certifies the validity of information released about the issuer. Megginson and 
Weiss’ empirical findings support the certification theory.
Our propositions lead to three major testable hypotheses. First, the 
consummations of a private common equity placements should elicit 
abnormal returns greater than the abnormal returns other researchers have 
found for public issuances of common stock. Second, the consummations 
of a private common equity placements should elicit positive abnormal 
returns. Third, because of the reduced uncertainty about share value, 
consummations of private common equity placements should be 
accompanied by reductions of volatility of the issuers’ stock prices. The tests 
of the hypotheses are refined by analysis of reactions to issuers with very thin 
markets and less thin markets and to issuers trading OTC and those listed 
on exchanges.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
We obtained the consummation dates of private common equity placements 
from three sources: 90 issuances from Standard & Poors Corporation Records,
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20 from a computer based data bank UUMI/Data Courier), and two from 
the Wall Street Journal Index. After elimination of contaminated events and 
issuing firms whose price data were unavailable, 52 issuances by 48 
corporations remained. Of these, 38 corporations gave the precise date of the 
consummation, and 14 gave only the month of consummation. The 38 events 
comprise the initial sample for analysis.
Price data were from Standard & Poors Daily Stock Prices. We used 
“close” prices when available, and “bid” prices otherwise. Prices were 
adjusted for splits and reverse splits where appropriate.
Standard event study methodology^ employed an estimation period from 
150 through 31 days before the event day. The examination period was 30 
days before through 30 days after the event day. The event day (to) was the 
date the issuing company stated that the common stock private placement 
was consummated. Abnormal returns (ARs) were based on the S&P500 as 
a market proxy.
TESTS AND RESULTS 
The Full Sample
The first test is to analyze the market reaction to common stock private 
placements for the entire sample of 38 issuers. Although the standard error 
of the average abnormal returns for the estimation period is of no specific 
statistical importance by itself, we are struck by its magnitude of 1.132%. The 
standard error is high for a naive portfolio of this breadth, but consistent 
with the subjective notion that the firms that use private equity placements 
are less well-established, and thus more risky than more typical firms.
The abnormal returns for t-io through i+io appear in Table 1. The only 
statistically significant one-day ARs are a positive AR on t-u and a negative 
AR on <-20 (these do not appear in Table 1). There is no apparent causal 
link between these data and the equity placement event. Closer to the event 
date, one finds four consecutive positive ARs: 1.306% on t-\, 1.094% on ta,
0.724% on <+1, and 2.184% on t+i.
Frequently, in studies of this kind, the analyst concentrates on the 
cumulative abnormal return (CARs) for days to, to allow for cases where the 
market received information about the event while the exchanges sire open, 
and t*\, to allow for cases where the market received the information after 
exchanges close. The CARo,+i for the full sample for private common stock 
issuances is 1.818% percent with a ^-statistic of 1.136. While this return is 
not statistically different from 0.0 by the two-tail test, one is struck by its 
magnitude compared to the —3.14% AR Smith [10] found for public issues
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Table 1
Private Issues of Common Stock Event Study Results
Day
[w =  38] 
Abnormal 
Returns'  ^
Full 
Sample
[n =  20] 
Abnormal 
Returns 
“Thin” 
Sample
[n =  18] 
Abnormal 
Returns 
“Not Thin” 
Sample
[n =  29] 
Abnormal 
Returns 
OTC  
Sarnple
h  =  9] 
Abnormal 
Returns NYSE 
^AM EX  
Sample
-30 through
-11 -3.328 -2.209 -4.571 -4.188 -0.555
-10 -0.727 -2.875 1.659 -1.321 1.186
-9 0.289 2.425 -2.084 0.492 -0.364
-8 0.969 1.066 0.861 0.914 1.146
-7 0.991 1.858 0.027 0.596 2.262
-6 -0.947 -2.514 0.795 -1.752 1.649
-5 0.464 0.061 0.910 0.457 0.483
-4 -0.441 -1.246 0.454 -0.741 0.527
-3 -0.914 -1.741 0.004 -0.938 -0.838
-2 -1.201 -0.993 -1.431 -0.955 -1.993
-1 1.306 1.483 1.110 1.712 -0.002
0 1.094 1.351 0.808 1.348 0.274
+1 0.724 0.704 0.747 1.039 -0.292
+2 2.184 4.164* -0.017 3.004* -0.460
+3 -1.770 -2.450 -1.014 -1.082 -3.984
+4 0.127 1.167 -1.028 0.210 -0.138
+5 -0.407 -0.473 -0.334 -0.714 0.583
+ 6 0.090 0.509 -0.376 0.470 -1.136
+7 -0.020 1.117 -1.282 -0.266 0.774
+8 0.754 1.826 -0.438 0.891 0.310
+9 -0.469 -1.170 0.311 0.079 -2.232
+10 -0.858 -0.618 -1.125 -1.640 1.661
+11 through
+30 1.372 8.740 -6.814 1.966 -0.543
CARo,+i 1.818 2.055 1.554 2.387 -0.018
CAR-1^ +2 5.308* 7.702* 2.647 7.104* -0.010
S-21 1.433 2.569 0.898 1.847 1.278
St21 0.499 0.750 0.563 0.607 1.020
f-stat 8.241*** 11.737*** 2.546** 9.256*** 1.571
S'-21 1.134
S'+21 0.228
F-stat 4.972***
Notes: All returns are stated as percents.
* This datum has a ^statistic significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
of seasoned common stock. In fact, when one tests the hypothesis CARo,+i 
>  —3.14%, one finds a ^-statistic of 3.09, significant at the 0.01 level by the 
one-tail test; thus, the data infer that private issues of common stock elicit 
an AR less unfavorable than public issues.
The four-day cumulative abnormal return, CAR-1,+2, is 5.308% with a 
i-statistic of 2.345, significant at the 0.05 level. For the AR on t-\ to have 
economic relevance, some portion of the market would have to anticipate 
the consummation of the stock issuance a day before it occurs. This 
circumstance is at least possible, since insiders could leak information about 
the event. Less likely, from the viewpoint of the efficient market hypothesis, 
is the relevance of the AR on t+z. Some portion of the market would have 
to become aware of the event a day (or two) late or have to realize a day (or 
two) late the importance of the private common stock issuance. 
Pragmatically, since many of the issuing companies are small and not widely 
followed, the delayed awareness of the event is also at least possible. Thus, 
the large positive CAR-1,+2 could suggest that outside investors view a private 
placement of common stock favorably.
Lease, Masulis and Page’s [3] sample of public common stock issuance 
announcements has a 0.10% decrease in standard deviation between a period 
before the announcem ent and an equally long period after the 
announcement. They propose that the lower volatility is because the 
information signalled by the event decreases uncertainty about the issuer. 
We performed a similar test of volatility, comparing the standard deviation 
of the first 21 days (roughly one trading month—appears as s-21 in Table 
1) of the examination period to the last 21 days (s+21 in Table 1) of the 
examination period. This method reduces bias that occurs from the volatility 
caused by the event itself. The standard deviation for the first 21 days is 1.433%, 
and for the last 21 days is 0.499%. These two statistics produce an F-statistic 
of 8.241, significant at the 0.01 level. Figure 1 gives visual evidence of how 
the volatility decreases after the consummation date.
For further evidence on volatility, we expanded the sample to include 
the 14 issuers for whom only the month of private equity placement is known. 
The 120-day estimation period for the expanded sample (52 events) is 
immediately before the first of two examination periods. The first 
examination period is 21 days previous to the 15 th of the calendar month 
before the private placement month. The second examination period is 21 
days after the 15th of the calendar month after the private placement month. 
The standard deviation (s'-2i in Table 1) of the ARs in the first examination 
period is 1.134%, and the standard deviation in the later examination period 
(s'+2i) is 0.228%. These two statistics yield an F-statistic of 4.972, significant 
at the 0.01 level. A similar test of raw returns over the same examination
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periods yields an earlier standard deviation of 1.139% and a later standard 
deviation of 0.269%. Their F-statistic is 4.227, significant at the 0.01 level.
The evidence strongly suggests that volatility decreases in response to 
private placements of common stock. However, Lease, Masulis and Page 
propose that the unfavorable information signalled by public common stock 
issuances reduces uncertainty stemming from asymmetric information, and 
thus price volatility decreases. In contrast, the data from the samples of 
private common stock issues show positive ARs in the proximity of the 
consummation day. Any asymmetric information signalled by private 
common stock placements cannot be explained by the implied cash flow 
hypothesis (Miller and Rock [6]) or the adverse selection hypothesis (Myers 
and Majluf [8]). We proposed that increased confidence in the validity of 
share prices is caused by investors inferring the inside knowledge of the value- 
maximizing insider from the price the insider negotiated in the private 
placement.
Thinly Traded Shares versus Broadly Traded Shares
The arrival of a value-maximizing insider not only has agency cost 
reduction significance, but also should make outside shareholders, as well 
as others who are observing the stock as a potential investment, more 
confident about the accuracy of the shares’ price relative to the firm’s 
economic value. This is especially true for stocks that are thinly traded, where 
the market could perceive that the quoted bid-ask prices are influenced more 
by the market maker’s assessment than by an auction process among buyers 
and sellers. Thus, we segmented the sample into a “thin” subsample and 
a “not thin” subsample to test whether thinness is a factor in the market’s 
reaction to common stock private placements.
Since market thinness is a relative term, we chose to classify a stock as 
thin if there were days within the estimation and examination periods on 
which no trades occurred. Thus, the original sample of 38 issuers was divided 
into 20 issuers deemed to experience thin trading and 18 issuers deemed to 
not experience thin trading. The CARo,+i for the subsample of thin stocks 
is 2.055% with a i-statistic of 0.855, and the CAR-i,+2 is 7.702% with a i-statistic 
of 2.266, significant at the 0.05 level. The AR on i+2 is 4.164%, with a t- 
statistic of 2.451, significant at the 0.05 level. The standard deviation for the 
first 21 days of the examination period is 2.569%, while the standard deviation 
of the last 21 days is 0.750%. These last two statistics yield an F-statistic of 
11.737, significant at the 0.01 level. These results parallel the results from 
the full sample with the CARs being larger and the difference in the standard 
deviations being larger. Thus, the data from the thin stocks provide some 
evidence that the market reacts favorably to private issues of thinly traded
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common stock and that market volatility of thinly traded stocks decreases 
after a private placement. Since thinly traded stocks are generally small firms, 
the evidence intimates that private placements by small firms receive 
favorable market attention.
The subsample of stock not subject to thin trading exhibits similar signs 
for the analyzed statistics, but the magnitudes are smaller and the level of 
statistical significance is also less. CARo,+i is 1.554% with a i-statistic of 0.900, 
and CAR-1,+2 is 2.647% with a ^-statistic of 1.083. CARo,+i is 4.69% less than 
Smith’s —3.14% for public common stock issuances—the one-tail test of 
whether private placements of common stock that are not subject to thin 
trading have a return greater than —3.14% yields a ^-statistic of 2.72%, 
significant at the 0.01 level. The ARs for first 21 days of the examination 
period have a standard deviation of 0.898%, while the standard deviation for 
the last 21 days is 0.563%. These two standard deviations yield an F-statistic 
of 2.546, significant at the 0.05 level. Thus, the evidence gives no statistically 
significant support to the hypothesis of ARs (positive or negative) in response 
to private placements of common stock that are not thinly traded. The 
evidence does give statistically significant support to the hypothesis that price 
volatility falls after private placements of common stock.
OTC Private Issuances versus Listed Stock Private Issuances
Given that our definition of thinness in the preceding tests is subjective, 
we further test the data by segmenting the private common stock issuers into 
those whose shares traded over the counter at the time of private issue and 
those that traded on AMEX or NYSE. Generally, companies traded over the 
counter are more representative of small firms than those traded on an 
exchange. Specifically, all OTC issuers in our sample (with the exception 
of Blockbuster Entertainment) are small compared to the typical AMEX and 
NYSE listed stock. The sample of 38 private common stock issuers is 
composed of 29 OTC and nine exchange traded—three AMEX and six NYSE.
For the OTC subsample, CARo,+i is 2.387% with a ^-statistic of 1.245, 
and the CAR-1,+2 is 7.104% with a ^-statistic of 2.620, significant at the 0.05 
level. Day f+2 has an AR of 3.004%, with a t-statistic of 2.216, significant at 
the 0.05 level. The ARs for the first 21 days of the examination period have 
a standard deviation of 1.847%, while the last 21 days have a standard 
deviation of 0.607%. These two standard deviations yield an F-statistic of 
9.256, significant at the 0.01 level. The data for the OTC subsample give 
some evidence that the market reacts favorably to private placements of 
common equity and strong evidence that volatility decreases after a private 
issuance of common stock.
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Although the sample of exchange traded stocks is small, the degree 
to which the results differ from our previous findings is remarkable. Each 
AR for t-i through Ua is negative except for to where the AR is 0.274%. 
CARo,7 is —0.018% with a ^-statistic of —0.010, and CAR-1,+2 is —0.480% 
with a i-statistic of —0.188%. The signs of these data are consistent with 
the signs for market reactions to seasoned public issuances of common 
stock, but the magnitudes of the ARs in response to exchange traded issues 
are far from significant. The standard deviation of the ARs for the first
21 days of examination period is 1.278% and greater than the standard 
deviation for the last 21 days, 1.020%, but the difference is not statistically 
significant. Thus, this small sample provides no support for a hypothesis 
that the market reacts to private common stock issuances by exchange 
traded issuers.
Signs Tests
To augment the tests above, we apply the non-parametric Signs Test 
to CAR-1,+2 for the full sample and each subsample. Table 2 shows that 
the results allow the rejection of the hypothesis that the number of positive 
CAR-i,+2S equals the number of negative for the full sample, for the sample 
of thinly traded stocks and for the sample of OTC stock. The hypothesis 
is not rejected for the other two subsamples. These results lend further 
support to the proposition that private placements are viewed favorably 
by the market, especially so for thinly traded or OTC stocks.
Table 2
Results of the Signs Test as Applied to 
CAR-1,+2 in Response to Consummations of 
Private Placements of Common Stock
CAR-1,^1 >  0 CAR- i,*2 < 0 Z-statistic
Level of 
significance
Full sample (38) 23 15 2.596 0.05
Thin sample (20) 13 7 2.683 0.05
Not thin sample (18) 10 8 0.943 none
OTC sample (29) 19 10 3.343 0.01
NYSE/AMEX sample (9) 4 5 -0.667 none
CONCLUSION
Outside shareholders should benefit when the firm issues common stock 
through a private placement. This transaction creates a value-maximizing 
insider that has the incentive and ability to monitor and discipline, thereby 
reducing agency costs. Investors can reduce uncertainty about the value of 
thinly traded shares by inferences from the price negotiated by the well- 
informed buyer. Both of these benefits are especially applicable to small 
firms.
The empirical evidence strongly supports the hypothesis that private 
common stock placements engender greater abnormal returns than public 
offerings of seasoned common equity. There is weaker supporting evidence 
that the private issues elicit positive abnormal returns and strong evidence 
that volatility decreases after a private common stock placement. Our 
subsamples for thinly traded stock yielded similar results, as did our 
subsample of only OTC stock. Thus, we conclude a private placement of 
common equity seems to be more beneficial to outside shareholders of small 
corporations.
NOTES
1. Blackwell and Kidwell [1], in one of the few academic journal studies of public placements, 
find the costs of publicly sold debt exceed those of privately placed debt in some cases 
and are nearly the same in other cases.
2. Theorists believe the demand curve for shares is horizontal, since investors are concerned 
only with risk and return and therefore can find perfect substitutes for the shares of any 
firm. Practitioners believe that investors are concerned with firm characteristics that go 
beyond just risk and return.
3. Spragins [12] reports that a “prenegotiated [sic] put’” requires some private common 
stock issuers to repurchase the investor’s shares at a price based on fair market value.
4. When the issuer’s shares are traded OTC, outside shareholders’ ignorance of the firm’s 
status is exacerbated by the lack of information that might have been inferred had the 
firm been listed and met listing requirements.
5. The authors will provide equations for this method upon request.
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